This article was published in the January/February 2025 (Vol.50#1) issue of the New Zealand International Review journal  under the title "A Chance for Peace".

An accelerated corruption of the power to veto any resolution in the UN Security Council by permanent members threatens the world order within the United Nations framework. The threedecades-long discussions in the format of the UN Open-Ended Working Group and then Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform have been aiming for a complex reformation of the Security Council. With no agreement in sight today, it is paramount to prioritise a standalone resolution of a single most impactful issue — abuse of the veto privilege. Attempted calls to voluntarily restrain from opposing drafted resolutions concerning specific topics, such as mass atrocities, were ignored by three out of five permanent members. Increased international scrutiny and moral pressure at the follow-up meetings of the General Assembly over a registered veto in the Security Council proved futile.

To avoid being coerced by empowered states, New Zealand (along with other small countries), if it still trusts in diplomacy, must mobilise its international credibility capital and push for adherence to the rule of law. In particular, this article recommends championing already available mechanisms under the United Nations Charter obligation of a party to a dispute to abstain from voting in the Security Council and advancing their legal potency.

The Security Council fails in its core function of maintaining global peace and security. An abuse of the veto privilege has been preventing the United Nations from adopting legally binding resolutions concerning the adequate reaction to atrocities against civilians (as in Syria), aggressions against other states (as in the Russian invasion of Ukraine), consolidated actions against active terrorist organisations (like Hamas) and, lately, a commitment to the standing international Outer Space Treaty precluding the proliferation of the nuclear weapons in space. In such circumstances of international legal limbo, small states, like New Zealand, can find themselves powerless against the assertive actions of larger and privileged geopolitical rivals.

Initiatives to reform the Security Council have been futile for the last three decades. Since the expansion in 1965, the Security Council has consisted of the existing five permanent mem- bers (United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia) with the power to veto any motion and ten non-permanent members without that power elected for a two-year tenure. In the 1990s, the General Assembly commenced a review of the representation and effectiveness of the Security Council, reformatted and formalised in 2008 as the Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) among groups of the UN member-states, which continues today. The IGN process produced the Framework Document in 2015 and the regularly amended and lately titled ‘Revised Co-Chairs’ Elements Paper on Convergences and Divergences on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters’. Among the five pivotal issues under negotiation are questions of the veto, on which this article focuses, and the size and working methods of the Security Council, which are considered among alternatives and alongside recommendations.

Alternative approaches

Among states and academia, some argue that expanded membership in the Security Council would increase global public pressure on the permanent five and persuade them not to use the veto against those resolutions which garner broad international support.1 Currently, several alternative Security Council models are being discussed within the IGN. Aside from the veto question and methods, proposals cover membership status (permanent and non-permanent), total number of members (21–27), years to serve (two to ten) and regional quotas. New Zealand has been supporting the ‘Intermediate model’ proposed by Liechtenstein, which recommended an expansion of the Security Council mainly through six new long-term non-permanent seats without veto power. Australia has been backing the proposal from the Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), which suggests six new permanent seats and further enlargement of the two-year non-permanent membership. Other models under consideration include those from the Uniting for Consensus bloc, predominantly representing regional rivals of the Group of Four, and from the L.69 Group, which consists of approximately three dozen developing countries. An expanded membership is part of a complex geopolitical solution, on which agreement remains elusive even after many years of discussions.

Some members have championed enhancement of the methods by which the Security Council works and interacts with the General Assembly as a means of improving accountability for vetoes that are cast. For instance, Resolution A/RES/76/262, adopted in April 2022 and known as Liechtenstein’s Veto Initiative, mandates an urgent debate by the General Assembly every time a veto is registered in the Security Council, enabling broad international scrutiny of a permanent member’s decision. Despite being lauded by many countries, including New Zea- land and Australia, this initiative has failed to moderate abuse of the veto power, with the number of resolutions vetoed over the two years following its passage being identical to those between 2017 and 2019.² Past initiatives proposed to suspend the use of the veto in cases concerning mass atrocities. More than 120 countries, including the United Kingdom and France, became signatories to the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency informal code of conduct, whose members pledged not to vote against credible proposals concerning genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Notwithstanding often overwhelming collective moral pressure, Russia and China in particular continued to shield their geopolitical self-interest and veil their crimes behind the veto at a massive cost in human lives worldwide.

Solutions which need an amendment of the UN Charter depend on international consensus but pivotally on an agreement among the five permanent members. However, some of these members are steadfast in vetoing any amendments which might dilute their power. Proposals based on voluntary pledges assume common moral values. Unfortunately, Russia and China have consistently demonstrated over a prolonged period that they do not share the moral standards upheld by the West, thus separating themselves from the other three permanent members. Moreover, applying any restrictions on veto usage requires a legitimate and timely decision on whether a case under consideration meets the agreed conditions. Therefore, in today’s global circumstances, the foremost diplomatic task of the United Nations must be to resolve the veto problem directly and agilely.

Existing provision

The Charter of the United Nations already contains a legal provision to limit the veto power under Article 27:

• Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

International legal scholars³ consider this to require obligatory abstention for a party to a dispute and point to precedents of the abstention rule’s observation in the past. An inter-state armed aggression is a breach of the peace. Ukraine and other UN members have regularly reminded the international community that protecting the peace through resolving international disputes is the primary purpose of the Security Council and hence urged its members to adhere to the provision. To attempt that, members of the Security Council must be the first to formally challenge the legitimacy of the veto vote registered by a permanent member that might reasonably be considered a party to the dispute in question.

In any specific case, any UN member has the right to lodge an issue with the International Court of Justice, seeking formal interpretation and ruling on the legitimacy of the vote under the terms of the UN Charter. According to Article 94, paragraph 1, the decision of the international court must be complied with by a party to a dispute. The General Assembly should also discuss the interpretation of the abstention clause in Article 27 and formalise any agreements on further actions through drafting and voting for a resolution. UN members must diligently observe this provision and stand up collectively and legally against any state that breaches its terms. Ultimately, the international court should hold supreme authority in questions of interpretation of UN treaties and legal documents, with no member standing above its ruling.

Active support

The New Zealand government and its representatives in the United Nations should actively support moves to limit the use of the veto power by the existing permanent members in the Security Council, referring to Article 27, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter: l At every official occasion, promote and champion the provision’s interpretation as an obligatory abstention from voting by a party to a dispute. l Encourage partners in the Security Council to challenge and formally raise an issue of adherence to the provision immediately upon every instance of its abuse. l After every veto use deliberation at the following UN General Assembly meeting as per the Veto Initiative resolution, if there are still reasonable concerns about the veto privilege abuse, formally submit the issue before the International Court of Justice to judge its coherence with the provision. l Within the General Assembly, discuss and advocate for the international court’s legal powers to judge the interpretation of provisions in UN treaties and documents and formalise agreements and necessary actions by drafting and voting a resolution.

Engagement in these initiatives would help to accelerate the resolution of veto abuses by permanent members of the Security Council on individual occasions, expedite legitimate actions to deter even a privileged aggressor and ensure that existing UN international legal and security frameworks remain relevant and potent in protecting global and regional peace.

To ensure national and regional security, the New Zealand government must advance the legal power of the UN Charter’s provision prohibiting the use of the veto by a party to a dispute in the Security Council. This endeavour is the only remaining diplomatic hope to carve peace out of the stagnating concept of the United Nations.

Kyrylo Kutcher is a Ukrainian- New Zealander and holds a master of science degree from National Technical University of Ukraine ('Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute'). He is currently in the Politics and International Relations programme at Massey University.

Notes

1. Stewart Patrick (ed), UN Security Council Reform: What the World Thinks, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023 (carn egieendowment.org/2023/06/28/un-security-council-reform-whatworld-thinks-pub-90032); Bjarke Z. Winther, ‘A Review of the Academic Debate about United Nations Security Council Reform’, Chinese Journal of Global Governance, vol 6, no 1 (2020), pp.71–101.

2. Hasmik Egian, ‘Who Knew? Reform is Happening in the UN Security Council’, PassBlue, 24 Apr 2024 (www.passblue.com/2024/04/24/ who-knew-reform-is-happening-in-the-un-security-council/).

3. Anne Peters, ‘The war in Ukraine and legal limitations on Russian vetoes’, Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, vol 10, no 2 (2023), pp.162–72; Stephen E. Smith, ‘Reviving the obligatory abstention rule in the UN Security Council: Reform from the Inside Out’, New Zealand Yearbook of International Law, vol 12 (2014), pp.15–27.